HIDE/SHOW IMAGE
56a
{Shabbat 137b}
like the case {in Eruvin 67b} of a certain infant whose hot water spilled, Rabba said to them: bring water from my house. Abaye said to him: But they made no eruv {chatzeirot}! He {Rabba} said to him: Let us rely on the shituf {of alleyways}! Abaye said to him: They made no shituf. {Rabba said:} Let them say to a gentile to bring it from my house! {Subsequently} Abaye said {to him}: I had a mind to dispute even this last order of my master, but Rav Yosef would not permit me to do this; for Rav Kahana said: Where a biblical ordinance is in question the case should be discussed before the act is committed, but in the matter of rabbinical ordinances the deed may be accomplished and then the decision may be asked for.
Later he {Rav Yosef?} asked him: Upon what grounds do you desire to dispute him?
He {Abaye} said to him: from this that they learnt {in a brayta}:
{Eruvin 68a}
The sprinkling {of an unclean man with the ashes of the red heifer by a clean man} is a rabbinical ordinance. Likewise telling a gentile {to perform a forbidden labor} is a rabbinical ordinance. Just as sprinkling is rabbinic ordinance and does not push off Shabbat, so too telling a gentile is a rabbinical ordinance and does not push off Shabbat.
He said to him {Abaye}: And did you not learn the distinction between a rabbinic ordinance that has to it an action and a rabbinic ordinance that lacks an action? For Master did not say to the gentile 'go heat for me' which is an action which is prohibited Biblically, but rather 'go bring me' which lacks an act of the hands, but is in its totality only speech.
He was silent and found no answer.
And we have considered the matter and have found that these {the conclusion that the halachot gedolot derives that one may tell a gentile to repair the scalpel} are not words to be relied upon, and from the substance of this case you learn that it is forbidden to tell a gentile to repair it or to bring it via a public domain -- from the fact that he said to him {Abaye} "For Master did not say to the gentile 'go heat for me'" it is clear that it is forbidden to tell a gentile to 'go heat for me.'
And many of the {post-Talmudic} Rabbis erred in their understanding of this sugya, in that they think that this that "He said to him {Abaye}: And did you not learn the distinction between a rabbinic ordinance that has to it an action and a rabbinic ordinance that lacks an action?" is going on the rabbinic ordinance regarding sprinkling, he spoke to him - that the rabbinic ordinance of sprinkling is the rabbinic ordinance that has to it an action, while the rabbinic ordinance of speaking is the rabbinic ordinance that lacks an action, in that it is merely speech - and it is difficult for them as follows - for they say, "since speaking to a gentile is a rabbinic ordinance which lacks an action, what is the difference if he says to him {the gentile} 'bring it from within my house' or if he says to him 'go heat up for me?' In both instances, it is a rabbinic ordinance which lacks an action, for it is mere speech, and thus permitted!"
And all of these people introduce an error in the nusach {text} of the gemara, for they maintain that there should not be in the gemara this statement that "Master did not say 'go heat for me'" but rather there is an error in the nusach of the gemara.
And it is not in fact as they understand it, and the nusach does not in fact have an error in it, but rather it is a superior nusach, but it should not be explained as they attempted to explain it. Rather, this that he said to him {Abaye}, "And did Mar not learn the distinction between a rabbinic ordinance that has to it an action and a rabbinic ordinance that lacks an action?" -- he was not speaking about the rabbinic ordinance of sprinkling, but rather, so did he say to him:
This that you said that speaking to a gentile is a rabbinic ordinance, and that you compare it to the rabbinic ordinance of sprinkling, such that it is forbidden, do you not make a distinction between the rabbinic ordinance that the speaking itself is trying to accomplish {in other words, the rabbinic action X, where you ask the gentile to accomplish action X} between a rabbinic ordinance which has in it a melacha {labor} and a rabbinic ordinance which lacks a melacha? For Master did not say 'go heat up for me,' which {heating} has to it a melacha, but rather 'go bring to me from my house,' which is merely moving it {tiltul}, and in which there is no melacha.Thus it is made clear to you that there is no error in the nusach, and they are clear matters.
For we derive from this that when we say that speaking to a gentile {to request he perform something forbidden to you on Shabbat} is a rabbinic ordinance, this is as regards something which is a melacha, but as regards something which is not a melacha, such as the present case, we do not say that speaking to a gentile is a rabbinic ordinance.
And this that we say {use the terminology} a rabbinic ordinance {shevut} which lacks an action {maaseh} and do not say a rabbinic ordinance which lacks a labor {melacha}, "action" and "labor" in this subject are one and the same, for men call labor "action" as we say "And between the seventh day to the six days of action {yemei haMaaseh}" and this refers to labor.
And it was already made clear to you that it is forbidden to tell a gentile to repair it {the scalpel} or do bring it via a public domain. And this that the Baal Halachot says is a mistake, and one should not rely upon it.
And a gentile is forbidden to circumcise, for we learn in tractate Avoda Zara {Avoda Zara 27b}: How do we know that circumcision via a gentile that it is invalid?
Daru bar Papa cited Rav: As it is written {in Bereishit 17:9}:
Bereishit 17:13}:
HaMal {without the cholam} Yimol it is read. {that is, one who is circumcised does the circumcision}.
What is the difference between them? This is the difference: A woman.
To Rav, who says וְאַתָּה אֶת-בְּרִיתִי תִשְׁמֹר - "And as for thee, thou shalt keep My covenant" - a woman, since she is not in the covenant {or circumcision} she may not circumcise.
To Rabbi Yochanan, who says הִמּוֹל יִמּוֹל - since he is an Israelite -- and even the uncircumcised {male Israelite} are like the circumcised. So too a woman is within the category of Israelite and may circumcise.
And if there is a Jewish woman who knows how to circumcise, and circumcises, it is fine, for the halacha is like Rabbi Yochanan, for it is established for us that {in a dispute between} Rav and Rabbi Yochanan, the halacha is like Rabbi Yochanan.
END PEREK NINETEEN
BEGIN PEREK TWENTY
MISHNA:
R. ELIEZER SAID: ONE MAY SUSPEND A STRAINER ON YOM TOV, AND POUR [WINE] THROUGH A SUSPENDED [STRAINER] ON SHABBAT.
BUT THE SAGES RULE: ONE MAY NOT SUSPEND A STRAINER ON YOM TOV, NOR POUR [WINE] THROUGH A SUSPENDED [STRAINER] ON SHABBAT, BUT WE MAY POUR [IT] THROUGH A SUSPENDED [STRAINER] ON YOM TOV.
Gemara:
"BUT THE SAGES RULE...":
It was a question to them: What if one does suspend [it]?
Rav Yosef said: If one suspends [it] he is liable to a sin-offering.
Abaye said to him: If so, if one hangs a pitcher on a peg. is he too liable?
{Surely not. Here too it is not a real building and is forbidden by Rabbinical law only.}
{Shabbat 138a}
Rather Abaye said: It is [forbidden] by Rabbinical law, in order that one should not act in the very way he acts on weekdays.
And so is the halacha.
Abaye collected some general principles of Baraithas, and he recited: One must not stretch out a leather bag, a strainer, a canopy, or a camp chair {Jastrow renders camp chair. Tosafot: a framework over which the leather seat was stretched; this is like the making of a tent}
Posts
No comments:
Post a Comment